In this paper, we study the notion of marginal independence between two sets of variables when uncertainty is expressed by belief functions as understood in the context of the transferable belief model. We define the concepts of non-interactivity and irrelevance, that are not equivalent. Doxastic independence for belief functions is defined as irrelevance and irrelevance preservation under Dempster's rule of combination. We prove that doxastic independence and non-interactivity are equivalent.
Introduction
An important requirement, for uncertainty reasoning system management, is to specify the conditions under which one item of information is considered independent from another, given what we know, and to represent knowledge in structures that display these conditions. In the probabilistic framework, these conditions are identified with the notion of independence, also called irrelevance or informational irrelevance [16] .
The notion of informational irrelevance has been extensively studied in probability theory [7] , [8] , [15] , [16] , where it is identified with independence. The concept of independence has also been studied in other non-probabilistic frameworks such that Spohn's theory of ordinal conditional functions [22] , Zadeh's possibility theory [1] , [4] , [9] , [11] , [24] , [27] , upper and lower probabilities theory [3] , [5] , [6] , and in an abstract framework that unifies different uncertainty calculi called valuation-based system [19] . However, the concept of independence has not been widely treated in belief functions theory.
The aim of this paper is to investigate some ways to define independence relationships between variables when uncertainty is expressed under the form of belief functions. Some other researches studying this topic are [3] , [17] , and [23] . We focus on belief functions in the context of the transferable belief model [21] , [20] , a model to represent quantified beliefs where the beliefs are represented by belief functions. In order to avoid possible confusion, we insist on the fact that the TBM is unrelated to lower probability models. We concentrate on the intuitive meaning of each definition of independence and we discuss the possible links between them. In this paper, we consider only the marginal case, leaving the conditional case for the second part.
In addition to the obvious theoretical reasons for the study of independence, there are also practical interests. Indeed, thanks to independence, many computational tasks can be simplified. Complex evidential problem can be modularized into simpler components in such a way that we only treat the pieces of information having relevance to the question we are interested in.
Furthermore, the practical importance of independence is captured in three processes supported by expert systems : elicitation, inference, and explanation [10] . For instance in the phase of eliciting probabilistic models from human experts, qualitative independencies among variables can often be easily and confidently asserted whereas numerical assessments can be very imprecise.
The question is how to define independence ? In the literature, there are two main approaches to define independence :
• Irrelevance approach : Two variables are said to be independent if no piece of information that can be learned about one of them can change our state of knowledge about the other. This form of independence is called irrelevance. It can be expressed by experts.
• Decomposition approach : Two variables are said to be independent if the global information about the two variables can be expressed as a combination of two pieces of knowledge, one for each variable. This form of independence is called here non-interactivity. It permits efficient computation by local computations without loosing any information.
In the case of probability theory, both approaches are equivalent, so the distinction is not essential. However, these approaches do not have identical meaning in belief function theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present some useful definitions and notations needed for belief function context. Next, in section 3, we present the definitions of irrelevance, non-interactivity and independence in probability theory. To extend these definitions to belief function case, we recall, in section 4, two definitions proposed by Shafer [17] called cognitive and evidential independence. After this, we define the concepts of marginal non-interactivity (section 5), irrelevance (section 6) and independence (section 7) for belief functions, making clear the links between them. Finally, in section 8, we make some concluding remarks.
Belief Function Theory

The Transferable Belief Model
The theory of belief functions, also known as Dempster-Shafer theory and theory of evidence, aims to model someone's degree of belief. It is regarded as a generalization of the Bayesian approach. Since this theory was developed by Shafer [17] , many interpretations have been proposed. Among them, we can distinguish:
• a lower probability model where beliefs are represented by families of probability functions and the belief functions are the lower envelop of these families. This model is considered as a special case of imprecise probabilities [25] .
• Dempster's model derived from probability theory where a probability space is mapped by a one-to-many mapping on another space. It is essentially at the core of the hint theory [13] .
• the transferable belief model (TBM) where beliefs are represented by belief functions [21] [20] . This model is unrelated to probability models whereas the other two are generalization of them.
In this paper, we are only concerned with the TBM, so we will use the concepts as defined in it. 
The value m(A) represents the degree of belief that is exactly committed to A. Due to the lack of information, m(A) cannot support any more specific event. The value bel(A) quantifies the strength of the belief that the event A occurs. A subset A such that m(A) > 0 is called a focal element of bel. bel is vacuous if the only focal element is Ω. In the TBM, we accept that m(Ø) can be positive. It reflects either the fact that the actual value of Ω might not be in Ω (open-world assumptions, [21] ) or the conflict that underlies the pieces of evidence used to build m.
Given a belief function bel, we can define a plausibility function pl: 2 Ω → [0,1] and a commonality function q:
The value pl(A) quantifies the maximum amount of potential specific support that could be given to A. The commonality function q(A) represents a measure of uncertainty in the context where A holds and it is useful for simplifying some computations. It is proved that m, bel, pl and q are in one-to-one correspondence with each other [17] .
Notations and Properties of Belief Functions
In this section, we present some notations and properties necessary when belief functions are used.
Variables.
Let U = {X, Y, Z, ...} be a set of finite variables, Θ X = {x 1 , ..., x n } be the domain relative to the variable X (with a finite cardinality n), and x represents any instance of X. For simplicity sake, we denote Θ X by X, Θ Y by Y ... Let Ω be a frame of discernment [17] (or universe of discourse). It is the Cartesian product of the domains of the variables in U. For example, X × Y represents the product space of variables X and Y , and when there is no ambiguity, it is simply denoted by XY . The elements of X (Y . . . ) are represented by indexed variables like x i (y j . . . ) whereas x (y . . . ) denote subsets of X (Y . . . ).
For x ⊆ X and y ⊆ Y , (x, y) is defined by (x, y) = {(x i , y j ) : x i ∈ x, y j ∈ y}, and similarly for (x, y, z) . . .
By construction, Ω is a common refinement of X, Y, Z... ( [17] , page 121). The variables X, Y, Z.... are themselves independent coarsenings of Ω ( [17] , page 127) where, for instance when Ω = XY Z, the "independence" means that:
While studying marginal independence, all we need is two disjoint subsets of variables in U. We can as well redefine two new variables X and Y which domains are the Cartesian product of those variables considered in each set, respectively. This simplifies the notation as we may consider only two variables X and Y , and Ω = XY .
We also often use the set Rect XY which is the set of subsets of XY that can be represented as (x, y) for some x ⊆ X and some y ⊆ Y .
Belief functions.
Let BK denotes the background knowledge that holds and that underlies the beliefs. In BK, we find the classical conditioning events. We introduce the following notations and their related properties:
The Ω superscript will not be mentioned when there is no risk of confusion. In particular, we have:
• bel Ω [BK] denotes the belief function on Ω when BK holds. It can be seen as a vector in a 2 |Ω| dimensional space. Classically, it was denoted as bel Ω (. | BK), but the bracket notation turns out to be more convenient.
•
When BK is the proposition that states that the actual value of Ω belongs to B ⊆ Ω, its value is given by :
These are the so called Dempster's rule of conditioning (except for the normalization factor).
• The (conjunctive) combination of two distinct bba's m 1 and m 2 , both defined on Ω, results in a new bba m 12 on Ω with, ∀A ⊆ Ω :
This rule is Dempster's rule of combination (except for the normalization factor). It is denoted here by the classical ⊕ symbol. So m 12 = m 1 ⊕ m 2 .
• Note that conditioning and marginalization do not commute, so the order of the symbols is important. bel
↓X is the belief function obtained by conditioning bel XY on y and the result is then marginalized on X.
In order to distinguish between normalized belief functions as those defined by Shafer and the unnormalized ones used in the transferable belief model, we use the following convention. Normalized functions have their first letter in upper-cases, whereas the unnormalized ones have theirs in lower cases. So M, Bel, Pl and Q denote the normalized forms, whereas m, bel, pl and q denote the unnormalized forms. To get the normalized forms, one just divide the unnormalized ones by the factor 1 − m(∅) (putting M (∅) = 0) or identically by bel(Ω) or pl(Ω).
Notations. The following notations are used repeatedly:
A particular Ω is often used. Its elements are defined as follows: N2. Let X = {x 1 , x 2 } and Y = {y 1 , y 2 }. We define Ω = X×Y = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 } with:
We next prove two useful lemmas and then we present several classical properties of belief functions theory for the reader's convenience.
Lemma 1 For any plausibility function pl
XY defined on XY , we have
. Thus it will neither be included in pl
So it is absent from both terms of the lemma.
Case 2: w ∩ y = ∅ then either w ∩ y ∩ x = ∅ and m XY (w) is not included in the two pl of the lemma, or w ∩ y ∩ x = ∅ and m XY (w) is included in both pl of the lemma.
This holds for any w ⊆ XY and any y ⊆ Y . Therefore, both pl of the lemma contain the same bbm and they are thus equal.
2
Lemma 2 For any plausibility function pl XY defined on XY , we have
, or w ∩ x = ∅ in which case it is included in both pl of the lemma. So, both pl of the lemma contain the same bbm and they are thus equal.
Some useful properties. We list some relations that will be used in the future and are classical in belief function theory.
Independence in Probability Theory
First, we recall the definition of probabilistic independence. We say that two random variables X and Y are (marginally) independent with respect to a distribution P on the space XY , denoted by X ⊥ ⊥ P Y , if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied: for all x ⊆ X, all y ⊆ Y ,
where P XY ↓X and P XY ↓Y are the marginal probabilities of P XY on X and Y , respectively.
where
↓X is the conditional probability on X given y.
In fact, thanks to the additivity of probability measures, it is sufficient that the property holds for all x i ∈ X, y j ∈ Y .
Remark. Our notation is more cumbersome than the usual one (i.e. such as in [8] , [16] ), but it helps when belief functions are involved as it avoids confusion.
The first definition of independence is presented in terms of the factorization of the joint probability distribution through its marginal distributions on X and Y , respectively (a mathematical property). It is also called separability or noninteractivity [27] (see section 5). We will use the last name.
The second definition can be interpreted in terms of irrelevance of information, it means that any information about Y is irrelevant to the uncertainty about X (an epistemic property).
In probability context, irrelevance and independence imply each other, hence the distinction is usually left aside.
Cognitive and Evidential Independence
To extend these definitions of independence to the case of belief functions, Shafer ([17] , page 147 et seq.) proposes two definitions of independence. After recalling these definitions, we introduce our definitions of (marginal) non-interactivity, irrelevance and doxastic independence for variables and we study the links between them. Shafer's definitions are based on normalized belief functions.
Cognitive Independence : Weak Independence
Following Shafer [17] , two variables are "cognitively independent" with respect to a belief function if new evidence that bears on only one of them does not change the degree of belief for propositions discerned by the other. This notion of "cognitive independence" is also called weak independence by Kong [14] . The formal definition of "cognitive independence" is the following : 
Evidential Independence : Strong Independence
Shafer [17] proposed another notion of independence called "evidential independence": two variables are "evidentially independent" if their joint belief function is represented by the combination of their marginals using Dempster's rule of combination. This notion of "evidential independence" is also called strong independence by Kong [14] . The formal definition of "evidential independence" is as follows: 
"Cognitive independence" is a weaker condition than "evidential independence" : if two variables are "evidentially independent" with respect to a belief function, then they will be "cognitively independent" with respect to it. Indeed, "evidential independence" requires constraints on Bel and on P l whereas "cognitive independence" requires only constraints on P l.
Based on the definition of "evidential independence", let us state the following theorems:
The variables X and Y are "evidentially independent" with respect to M XY if and only if:
where x is the projection of w on X, and y is the projection of w on Y .
Proof. See Shafer [17] 
Proof. Let ω ⊆ XY with x(ω) and y(ω) its projections on X and Y , respectively. Relation (5) can be rewritten, for all ω ⊆ XY , as:
The sum of all masses M XY ↓X (x) M XY ↓Y (y) over all x ⊆ X and y ⊆ Y is 1 as it corresponds to Q XY (∅) which is always 1. As far as the relation between Q and M is one-to-one, the only non zero masses M XY (ω) are those that admit the representation as M XY ↓X (x) M XY ↓Y (y), i.e., all focal elements of M XY belong to Rect XY . So that relation (5) holds is equivalent to the fact that relation (4) holds, and thus it is equivalent to X and Y being evidentially independent. 2 Remarks.
• "Cognitive independence" may hold whereas "evidential independence" fails, so "cognitive independence" does not imply theorem 1. In addition, neither (2) nor (3) implies the other. This is shown in the example 7.3 of Shafer ([17] , page 151) and in [2] .
• All definitions by Shafer and Kong assume normalized belief functions (m(∅) = 0).
• Shafer [17] does not explain the signification of the two adjectives : cognitive and evidential.
• Shafer speaks of "independence" but we will prefer the expression 'noninteractivity' as this definition is essentially a mathematical one and we keep the word 'independence' for the common sense property (see section 5).
• One could wonder why a definition based on only
was not proposed?. It is probably because it is useless.
Belief Function Non-Interactivity
In this section, we propose the definition of decompositional independence for belief functions. In possibility theory, there is an analogous definition introduced by Zadeh [27] where the decompositional independence between two variables is represented by the non-interactivity relation. We use this last terminology. The non-interactivity is a mathematical property useful for computations considerations when propagating beliefs in evidential networks [26] . Intuitively, the non-interactivity of two variables X and Y with respect to m XY means that the joint mass can be reconstructed from its marginals. The purpose is that for any functions f ∈ {m, bel, pl, q}, we have that f XY is some function of f X and f Y . As far as once it is true for m, it is true for all of them, we propose the following definition of non-interactivity. 
The scalar pl XY (X, Y ) is introduced because we tolerate unnormalized belief functions. We could (almost) identically propose the definition as:
which is equal to:
These definitions are all equal once pl XY (X, Y ) > 0. The 'almost' qualification covers the highly degenerated case where pl XY (X, Y ) = 0, relation (6) being still valid, whereas the others become undefined.
One might also ask why we use the ⊕ operator in definition 4. Its origin comes from the concept of specialization detailed in Klawonn and Smets [12] . The ⊕ is the only specialization that is associative and covers conditioning. Details can be found in [12] .
Theorem 3 Let m
XY be a bba on XY and X ⊥ m XY Y . Then the focal elements of m XY belong to Rect XY .
Proof. Notice that a non-normalized belief function on Ω can be normalized by just dividing it by pl(Ω). So if we divide both terms of relation (6) by (pl XY ) 2 , we get:
where M denotes normalized bba. In that case non-interactivity and Shafer's evidential independence definitions are equivalent, therefore, by theorem 1, the focal elements of M XY belong to Rect XY . As far as m XY is proportional to M XY , its focal elements are those of M XY and the empty set which belongs also to Rect XY .
From theorem 1, non-interactivity and Shafer's evidential independence definitions are equivalent when we consider normalized belief functions.
Thus relations (2) and (3) can be directly generalized into:
where relation (8) is obtained from relation (7) and lemma 2.
Non-interactive belief functions can easily be build by using any pair of belief functions, one being defined on X, the other on Y , provided they give the same bba to the empty set. 
Belief Function Irrelevance
In probability theory, the notion of independence can be defined in term of irrelevance. This kind of independence is based on conditioning. The intuitive meaning of irrelevance is that knowing the value y j of Y does not affect the beliefs on X. In belief functions theory, we propose the following definition of irrelevance:
Definition 5 Irrelevance. Given two variables X and Y , and m= m XY on XY , Y is irrelevant to X with respect to m, denoted by IR m (X, Y ), if and only if :
and ∀y ⊆ Y such that pl XY (X, y) = 0
In relation (10), we need ∝ because in the TBM context we do not normalize when applying Dempster's rule of conditioning. Under normalization, proportionality becomes equality. 
Proof. We prove that the proportionality between the plausibility functions is equivalent to the proportionality between the bba's. Let P be the 2 |Ω| × 2 |Ω| matrix operator that transforms a bba defined on Ω into its related plausibility function. The elements P A,B of P for A ⊆ Ω, B ⊆ Ω are given by : Let Ω = X. The multiplication by the matrix P of the two bba encountered in IR m (X, Y ) definition (relation 10) gives:
where α y is independent of x ⊆ X. 
Based on the definition of irrelevance, we can deduce the following consequences.
Theorem 6 Given two variables X and Y , and m= m XY on XY , the following assertions are equivalent:
Furthermore,
Proof. 1. We prove that 1 and 2 are equivalent. By theorem 5 and considering y ′ and y ′′ subsets of Y , we get
Using lemmas 1, 2, theorem 5 and relation (11) , relation (12) can be rewritten, for any x ⊆ X, as
Hence, (12) is proved.
3. Relation (13) results directly from the symmetry of relation (12) . 2
The third item of theorem 6 implies that IR is equivalent to Shafer's cognitive independence when belief functions are normalized.
Consider the particular belief function on XY that allocates a bba 1 to some (x, y) for x ⊆ X and y ⊆ Y . We show it satisfies the irrelevance property. In the following example, we show that irrelevance does not imply noninteractivity between variables.
Example. Let the sets X and Y be as defined by N2. Table 1 for ω such that:
.02 .85 w = XY .24 1.00 We feel the next property should also be satisfied by irrelevance. Let A 1 and A 2 denote two agents whose beliefs are considered. Suppose the first agent A 1 states that Y is irrelevant to X and produces his beliefs on XY and the second agent A 2 states that Y is irrelevant to X and produces his own beliefs on XY . Then the two agent beliefs on XY are combined by Dempster's rule of combination. We want that Y is still irrelevant to X under this combined belief function on XY .
This idea can be formalized by the next property, called Irrelevance Preservation under Dempster' rule of combination, and denoted by IRP ⊕.
Definition 6
We are going to show the major result of this paper, that is that IR & IRP ⊕ is equivalent to non-interactivity. We first prove it for the case where |X| = |Y | = 2 (section 6.1) and then for general X and Y (section 6.2).
Remark. This property is not described in probability theory as the concept of combination and the ⊕ operation are hardly considered.
The 2 × 2 Case
We consider the case where |X| = |Y | = 2 and prove that IR & IRP ⊕ implies non-interactivity. The proof is based on an analysis of the relation between m(∅) and the commonality function. Relation P2 gives:
We first analyze the term :
(lemma 4) then we show that m({ω 1 , ω 4 }) = m({ω 2 , ω 3 }) = 0 (lemma 5 and 6), and that m(w) = 0 for |w| = 3 (lemma 7), all these implying that the focal elements of m belong to the set of rectangles Rect XY defined on XY .
Lemma 4
Let Ω = XY be defined by N2. Let m = m XY and IR m (X, Y ) then:
Proof. All belief functions hereafter are initially defined on XY. For simplicity sake, we do not indicate the XY superscript.
Relation (14) becomes:
For i=1,2, j=1,2, let
, and:
Then the relation (15) becomes:
This last term is equal to
, hence the lemma is proved. Proof. We use the same notations as in the proof of lemma 4. By P2, we have:
With Lemma 4, this becomes : 0 = By symmetry the same holds for any A ⊆ XY such that | A |= 3. 2
The General Case
We have thus proved that IR & IRP ⊕ implies that all focal elements of XY belong to Rect XY for the case defined by N2. We now prove that the same holds in general.
Theorem 7
Let Ω = XY . Let m = m XY and IR m (X, Y ). Then IRP⊕ implies that m(A) = 0, whenever A does not belong to Rect XY .
Proof. Suppose A ⊆ XY does not belong to Rect XY , thus does not admit a representation as (x, y), for some x ⊆ X, y ⊆ Y and m(A) > 0. Then there exist a subset B of A such that B = {(x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 )} or B = {(x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 1 , y 2 )} for some x 1 , x 2 ∈ X, y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y, x 1 = x 2 , y 1 = y 2 .
Let C = {(x 1 , y 1 ), (x 2 , y 2 ), (x 1 , y 2 ), (x 2 , y 1 )} and let m C be the bba that induces the conditioning of m on C: so m C (C) = 1.
By lemma 3, we have IR m C (X, Y ). Combining m with m C leads to a bba on C, with all bba given to subsets of C. We are thus back to the conditions used in Lemmas 6 and 7. The bba m(A) is transferred by conditioning on C to B, and thus we have a mass that should be null in order to satisfy
Therefore the bba m(D) can be positive only if D ∈ Rect XY . 2
We can now prove that Proof. Suppose that both m XY and m ′ are normalized. It is sufficient then to prove that Shafer's evidential independence holds as this property is equivalent to non-interactivity (see section 5). We have already obtained that irrelevance implies Shafer's cognitive independence (12), so we must only prove that the product relation (3) for bel holds as well.
Let A ↓X denote the projection of A ⊆ XY on X. We have for x = ∅ :
In theorem 7, we have proved that m(D) > 0 only if D admits a representation as D = (x, y), for some x ⊆ X, y ⊆ Y . Let R* denote that property.
By theorem 5 and with pl XY (X, Y ) = 1, IR m (X, Y ) implies ∀x ⊆ X, x = ∅:
Applying on both side the transformation between plausibility functions and bba, one gets:
By the R* property, it becomes:
Computing then the bel functions by summing over all x ′ ⊆ x, x ′ = ∅, we get:
By the marginalization and conditioning definitions and R*, we get:
using R* Therefore we have:
This last relation being true for any x and y, we thus have proved that the product rule characterizing bel in Shafer's definition of evidential independence holds.
If the bba are unnormalized, the proof proceeds similarly. It consists in building the normalized bba m 
Theorem 8 means that when Y is irrelevant to X with respect to m and this irrelevance is preserved under Dempster' rule of combination with any other m * such that Y is also irrelevant to X with respect to m * , then X and Y are non-interactive with respect to m. We also show the reverse.
Proof. Immediate as X ⊥ m Y is equivalent to Shafer's evidential independence (5), up to the normalization factor. So the product rule for the pl function (2) is satisfied, in this case irrelevance is also satisfied (12) . The normalization factor is handled by the proportionality factor introduced in relations (6) Y . By theorem 2, the non-interactivity implies that ∀w ⊆ XY :
where x = ω ↓X and y = ω ↓Y , the projections of ω on X and Y , respectively. Applying Dempster's rule of combination, we get:
Therefore, X and Y are also non-interactive with respect to m 
Doxastic Independence
The most obvious difference between probabilistic independence and belief function independence is that irrelevance and independence have not identical meaning in the belief function framework. This distinction is not commonly considered in probabilistic framework where authors like Pearl [16] and Dawid [8] use the words irrelevance and independence interchangeably. In order to enhance this distinction, we use the expression doxastic independence for belief function independence. In Greek, 'doxein' means 'to believe'. The formal definition of doxastic independence is as follows : The intuitive meaning of this definition is that two variables are considered as doxastically independent only when they are irrelevant and this irrelevance is preserved under Dempster's rule of combination. According to the definition of doxastic independence of X and Y , with respect to m 1 and m 2 , respectively, we have:
IR m1 (X, Y ) and ∀m ∈ BIR, IR m1⊕m (X, Y ), (16) IR m2 (X, Y ) and ∀m ∈ BIR, IR m2⊕m (X, Y ).
As m 2 ∈ BIR, we replace m by m 2 in (16), we obtain thus IR m1⊕m2 (X, Y ).
For what concerns the IRP⊕, we must prove that for all m ∈ BIR,
This is true if m 2 ⊕ m ∈ BIR for all m ∈ BIR. By (17) we know that for any m ∈ BIR, IR m2⊕m (X, Y ), therefore m 2 ⊕ m ∈ BIR. 2
The link between doxastic independence and non-interactivity is given by the next theorem : 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied different concepts of marginal independence for belief functions. Of special interest for us is to clarify the relationships between the concepts of non-interactivity, irrelevance and doxastic independence when uncertainty is expressed under the form of belief functions as in TBM. Non-interactivity is defined by the 'mathematical' property that the joint belief function can be described by its marginals. Irrelevance is defined by the 'common sense' property that the result of conditioning the joint belief function on one variable and marginalizing it on the other variable produce a belief function that is the same whatever the conditioning event. Finally doxastic independence is defined by a particular form of irrelevance, the one preserved under Dempster's rule of combination. Irrelevance alone does not imply non-interactivity. The major theorem proves that doxastic independence is equivalent to non-interactivity, thus equating the 'common sense' definition with the 'mathematical' definition.
These concepts of marginal independence for belief functions can be extended to conditional case. The study of conditional independence in the framework of belief functions theory is similar to the marginal case and will be presented in a forthcoming paper.
